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Why do democracies survive or break down? We return to this classic 
question with an empirical study of Latin America between 1945 and 
2005 that employs a new research strategy. A rich body of qualitative 
studies of individual countries tells us that the survival or fall of demo-
cratic regimes depends on what political leaders, parties, militaries, so-
cial movements, and other key actors do. Their behavior is shaped, but 
not determined, by structural forces and cultural patterns. Scaling up 
from case studies is hard, however, and until now scholars’ ability to 
test theories based on actors’ preferences and behavior has been limited. 
Here we present an analysis that is mainly quantitative and aims at a 
preliminary assessment of how far certain key ideas from the qualitative 
literature can be generalized. 
Our study does not use a demanding definition of democracy. We 
begin with a tripartite classification, developed with Daniel Brinks, that 
categorizes Latin American political regimes as democratic, semidemo-
cratic, or authoritarian.1 For the purposes of this essay, we lump together 
democratic and semidemocratic regimes under the broader heading of 
“competitive regimes.” Although we occasionally refer to these regimes 
simply as “democratic,” the set of cases to which we are referring in-
cludes semidemocratic regimes as well. Between 1945 and 2005, the 
twenty countries of Latin America experienced a combined total of 644 
years under competitive systems. Our analysis explores why (and when) 
competitive regimes broke down and, conversely, what factors favored 
their survival. 
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Lessons from Latin America
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Our findings show that neither the level of development nor econom-
ic performance has directly shaped the prospects for democratic survival 
in Latin America. We focus instead on key actors’ normative prefer-
ence for democracy and their policy radicalism or moderation, as well 
as on the regional political environment. Democracies are more likely to 
survive when political actors have a strong normative preference for de-
mocracy and when they avoid radical policy positions. Moreover, demo-
cratic regimes are stronger when the regional environment facilitates the 
spread of democratic values and political moderation domestically. 
Our study builds on three key insights from the work of the late Guill-
ermo O’Donnell. The first appeared in O’Donnell’s seminal book Mod-
ernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (1973),2 which criticized 
modernization theory for positing too linear a relationship between 
development level and regime type. Our study, which covers a lon-
ger time span and a broader set of Latin American countries, confirms 
O’Donnell’s argument that the level of development has not had a direct 
impact on the survival of competitive regimes in the region. Second, in 
Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism and in some of his 
other works from the 1970s and early 1980s, O’Donnell argued that 
the “threat” posed to dominant elites (especially capitalists) by popular-
sector mobilization was an important trigger of democratic breakdowns 
in Latin America.3 Similarly, we argue that actors’ policy moderation 
or radicalism affects the survival or breakdown of competitive regimes.
In his “Introduction to the Latin American Cases” in Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule (coedited with Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead, 1986), O’Donnell first laid out some daunting obstacles to 
stable democracy in the region. But he then argued—and this is the third 
of O’Donnell’s insights upon which we draw—that a shift had taken 
place in the bulk of the region’s countries: “Most political and cultural 
forces of any weight now attribute high intrinsic value to the achieve-
ment and consolidation of political democracy. This is indeed a nov-
elty.”4 Taking this a step further, we argue that a competitive regime’s 
prospects for survival is affected by whether actors normatively (that is, 
intrinsically) value democracy as a political regime. 
Although these three insights of O’Donnell’s serve as the foundation 
for our study, we challenge one core idea in Modernization and Bureau-
cratic-Authoritarianism, which viewed democratic breakdowns through 
a structural lens. O’Donnell argued that structural characteristics of 
capitalism in Latin America’s more economically advanced countries 
explained why modernization theory did not hold for this region. We 
argue instead that modernization theory does not work in Latin America 
because the level of development in the region has had little impact on 
actors’ policy radicalism or their normative preferences for democracy.
In most countries of the region, competitive regimes were brittle 
until 1978—when the “third wave” of democratization began in Latin 
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America—but then became much more resilient. Most Latin American 
countries experienced at least one period of democracy or semidem-
ocracy before the 1970s, but many of these competitive regimes were 
short-lived. Starting in 1978, however, the newly established democra-
cies survived important challenges, and the cumulative number of com-
petitive regimes increased as new transitions took place. By 1991, eigh-
teen of the region’s twenty countries (all but Cuba and Haiti) enjoyed 
competitive politics, and there have been only minor oscillations since 
then. This transformation occurred primarily because the breakdown 
rate of competitive regimes (the number of breakdowns divided by the 
number of years of competitive politics) plummeted from 9.3 percent in 
1945–77 to 0.8 percent in 1978–2005 (the third-wave period). In other 
words, the breakdown rate was more than ten times greater in the earlier 
period than in the latter.
Policy Radicalism and Preference for Democracy
Two proximate factors affect whether competitive regimes remain in 
power or fall: First, do key social and political actors have radical policy 
preferences? And second, do they have a normative preference for de-
mocracy? Policy preferences may range from moderate to radical. Some 
actors also develop what we call a normative preference for democ-
racy. Policy radicalism and normative preferences regarding the regime 
are reasonably specific and measurable components of actors’ political 
identities. Actors form policy preferences (as well as normative prefer-
ences concerning the regime) in an interactive historical context. These 
preferences are not historically fixed, but they tend to be fairly stable. 
Actors support or oppose the existing regime based on some combina-
tion of their policy preferences and their normative preferences regard-
ing the political regime.  
Actors are radical when their policy goals are located toward one 
pole of the policy spectrum (toward the left or right if the policy space 
is one-dimensional) and they express either an urgency to achieve 
those goals (where those goals do not represent the status quo) or an 
intransigent defense of those positions (where they do represent the 
status quo). Radical policy preferences need not be on the extreme 
left or right, but they must be far enough from the preferences of other 
relevant actors to create polarization. They are intense preferences; 
radical actors are unwilling to bargain or to wait in order to achieve 
their policy goals.
Does the presence of powerful radical actors make it harder to sustain 
a competitive regime? We believe the answer is yes. The more extreme 
and more powerful the radical players become, the more threatened by 
democratic politics some other actors will feel. In order to protect their 
interests in cases of considerable radicalization—on the part either of 
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the government and its allies or of opposition actors—some powerful 
actors may try to subvert a competitive regime. 
This argument also applies to the government itself. When some 
actors fear that the continuation of a competitive regime will lead to 
their destruction or to major losses because the government has a radi-
cal agenda—whether this agenda is transformative or reactionary—the 
costs of tolerating the existing regime increase. The willingness of such 
actors to abide by the democratic rules of the game is likely to shrink, as 
will the regime’s survival prospects. 
Having a normative preference for democracy means that an actor 
values democracy intrinsically—in other words, above any specific pol-
icy outcomes. Such an actor is ideologically committed to democracy 
as the best kind of political regime. This commitment is expressed in 
his or her willingness to incur policy costs in order to defend the com-
petitive regime. A normative preference for democracy is different from 
situational or opportunistic behavior in which an actor’s support for the 
regime is contingent on policy results—in other words, on instrumental 
rationality. Of course, actors’ instrumental rationality in pursuit of their 
policy preferences is also a key determinant of why democracies survive 
or break down. 
There are many ways for actors to show their commitment to demo-
cratic principles. When candidates acknowledge their defeat in an elec-
tion instead of challenging the results, they signal their commitment 
to the democratic regime. When government leaders accept a congres-
sional defeat on an important issue rather than manipulating procedural 
rules to impose their preferred legislation, they signal their commitment 
to democratic procedures. These signals are credible to others precisely 
because they are costly. 
We hypothesize that a strong normative preference for democracy 
among political forces will make competitive regimes more resilient. 
Such a preference limits how far actors will go in pursuit of their policy 
goals. When democracy holds intrinsic value for the actors, they are 
more willing to endure policies that hurt their interests because they per-
ceive such policies as based upon legitimate, binding decisions. For the 
same reason, actors may be willing to reject beneficial policies if those 
policies have not been adopted by a legitimate regime. 
Although previous works have noted the importance of actors’ nor-
mative regime preferences,5 it is difficult to demonstrate this point em-
pirically for a large set of countries over a long period of time. Owing 
to difficulties of conceptualization, measurement, data gathering, and 
endogeneity, no previous quantitative analysis has undertaken such an 
endeavor. Among our basic assumptions is the notion that structural 
variables—a country’s level of development or degree of socioeconom-
ic inequality, for instance—do little to explain actors’ normative prefer-
ences or policy radicalism until a high level of development, at which 
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point most actors are nonradical and intrinsically prefer democracy. Our 
empirical analysis verifies this assumption.  
The Coding Rules We Followed
Collecting and measuring data were major challenges. We needed 
to combine a quantitative assessment testing the generalizability of ar-
guments for twenty countries over a long period of time with qualita-
tive case studies probing the causal mechanisms in a deeper way. The 
greatest difficulty for the quantitative work lay in identifying the most 
important actors in the twenty countries and then coding their policy 
radicalism and normative regime preferences. 
We engaged a team of nineteen research assistants to do this work. 
They undertook extensive research to prepare lengthy country reports 
that followed detailed coding rules. The reports described the main po-
litical actors during each presidential administration between 1944 and 
2010. They identified a parsimonious set of actors (usually 3 to 7 per 
presidential term) that were most prominent in historical works about 
each period. Included on the list were presidents, organizations, and 
movements that exerted strong influence in the competition for power. 
Together, the reports discussed 1,460 political actors and more than 
290 administrations. The president was almost always identified as a 
powerful actor. Political parties, labor unions, business associations, the 
military, guerrilla organizations, and social movements also commonly 
figured among the key actors. 
The researchers followed detailed coding rules to detect instances of 
radicalism and normative preferences for democracy. They coded politi-
cal actors as radical if they 1) expressed an uncompromising desire to 
achieve leftist or rightist policy positions in the short run or to preserve 
those positions where they were already in place; or 2) expressed a will-
ingness to subvert the law in order to achieve certain policy goals. The 
government was coded as radical if it 3) implemented polarizing poli-
cies that deliberately imposed substantial costs upon other actors (for 
example, expropriations without compensation or labor-repressive regu-
lations to increase labor supply). Nongovernmental actors were coded as 
radical if they 4) committed violent acts aimed at imposing or prevent-
ing significant policy change. If actors were divided or ambiguous about 
those positions, they were coded as somewhat radical; otherwise they 
were coded as not radical. 
Many political actors pay lip service to democracy, so the research 
team primarily documented the absence of a normative preference for 
democracy. Political actors were coded as lacking a preference for 
democracy if they did at least one of the following: 1) expressed am-
bivalence or questioned “bourgeois,” “liberal,” or “formal” democracy; 
2) expressed hostility toward democratic institutions [such as parties, 
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legislatures, courts, or electoral bodies] rather than simply challeng-
ing their decisions; 3) questioned the validity of democratic procedures 
when these produced unfavorable results; 4) claimed to be the sole rep-
resentative of the people; 5) questioned the legitimacy of any opposition 
outside an encompassing national movement; or 6) frequently dismissed 
peaceful opponents as enemies of the people or the country. 
Government officials were also coded as lacking a normative prefer-
ence for democracy if they 7) introduced programs of partisan indoctrina-
tion into the public school system or the military; or if they 8) manipulated 
institutional rules frequently in order to gain political advantage. Nongov-
ernmental actors were considered as lacking a preference for democracy if 
they 9) expressed willingness to subvert the constitution; or 10) accepted 
the use of fraud, political exclusions, or violence for political purposes. 
Actors were coded as having a strong normative preference for democ-
racy if they did not exhibit any of the ten hostile behaviors above, and as 
fairly strong but not entirely consistent in their normative support if they 
exhibited ambiguity with regard to any of these ten indicators.
These rules gave us a common basis on which to compare our twenty 
countries over a long period. The coding of radicalism and preference 
for democracy is conceptually independent of the coding for the politi-
cal regime. Actors’ positions on policy radicalism and normative prefer-
ence for democracy do not intrinsically affect a regime’s classification. 
The coding rules are based on behaviors and discourse that are observ-
able and documentable and are intended to screen out instrumental, in-
sincere deployment of democratic discourse. The indicators for coding 
radicalism and normative preferences for democracy do not eliminate 
the need for historical judgments about actors’ preferences, but they do 
put the judgments on firmer ground. 
We aggregated the information in a simple way. Actors were given 
a score of 1 (radical), 0.5 (somewhat radical), and 0 (not radical); and 
of 1 (a consistent and strong normative preference for democracy), 0.5 
(a fairly strong but not entirely consistent preference), and 0 (inconsis-
tent, ambivalent, or hostile views about liberal democracy on intrinsic 
grounds). We then estimated the average value of both variables in every 
country-year. Thus our variable radicalism can be roughly interpreted 
as the share of powerful actors with radical policy preferences, and our 
variable normative preference for democracy can be roughly interpreted 
as the proportion of actors with a normative commitment to democracy 
in each country between 1944 and 2010. 
The Figure on page 129 depicts the historical evolution of the means 
for the two variables in Latin America. Among competitive regimes, 
radicalism showed a sustained—though uneven—decline during the 
second half of the twentieth century. By contrast, normative support for 
democracy tended to increase over time. The gap between the two series 
stabilized by the mid-2000s.6 
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In 1977, seventeen of the twenty countries in Latin America had dic-
tatorships; only Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela enjoyed competi-
tive regimes. Around this time, the three competitive regimes displayed 
the lowest levels of radicalism and highest levels of normative demo-
cratic commitment for the entire period. This pattern suggests that in a 
hostile international environment, competitive regimes survived only in 
countries where political actors were moderate and wedded to a demo-
cratic ideal. 
Earlier studies have found a variety of alternative explanations for 
democratic stability and breakdown. Accordingly, we considered, in ad-
dition to our main independent variables, three theoretical clusters of 
explanatory variables: 1) structural factors [the level of economic de-
velopment, the size of the working class, and the degree of dependence 
on primary exports] and economic performance; 2) institutional design 
[party-system fragmentation and presidential powers]; and 3) interna-
tional conditions [the level of democracy in the rest of the region, and 
U.S. policies toward Latin America].
We measured the level of development using per capita GDP (in 2000 
U.S. dollars, based on World Development Indicators and Penn World 
Tables) and employed a quadratic specification to capture nonlinear ef-
fects. We used the percentage of the labor force in manufacturing as a 
gross indicator of the leverage of the working class; the size of the work-
ing class is relevant to testing theories which hold that a large working 
class is favorable to democracy. Because many scholars have argued 
that dependence on natural resources such as oil is detrimental to de-
mocracy, we included a dichotomous measure of natural-resource de-
pendence, coded as 1 if exports of oil and minerals typically represented 
more than 10 percent of the gross national income (according to World 
Development Indicators). We used change in per capita income (the rate 
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of economic growth, based on our per capita GDP figures) to assess 
economic performance. Weak economic performance might make com-
petitive regimes more vulnerable to breakdown. 
Some scholars have argued that presidential democracies with frag-
mented party systems are more prone to breakdown. We therefore cre-
ated a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the effective number of parties 
in the lower (or only) chamber was equal to or greater than 3.0 in a given 
year. Matthew Shugart and John Carey maintain that presidentialism 
functions more effectively when weaker presidential powers are written 
into the constitution.7 To assess this argument, we used their measure of 
presidential powers.
In order to investigate whether or not a favorable international envi-
ronment might enhance chances for democracy, we used the proportion 
of democratic countries in the region each year (excluding the country 
in question) as an indicator of the regional political environment. Fi-
nally, since the United States, as a hegemonic power in the Americas, 
can influence the likelihood of transitions to competitive regimes and of 
regime breakdowns, we created a continuous scale to assess the orienta-
tion of U.S. administrations toward democracy in Latin America. The 
scores range between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating solid U.S. support for 
fostering and protecting democracy in Latin America. 
The Risk of Democratic Breakdown
We estimated the risk of democratic breakdown using a discrete-
time survival model. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator 
coded as 1 for years in which the competitive regime broke down and 
was replaced by an authoritarian system, or as 0 if it survived that year. 
In addition to our main independent variables, radicalism and prefer-
ence for democracy, the equation includes the eight control variables de-
scribed in the previous section, plus a statistical transformation of time 
to capture any changes in the risk of breakdown during the life cycle of 
the regime and a random parameter to reflect latent regime frailties due 
to unobserved country characteristics.8 
Five statistical findings are particularly notable. First, actors’ policy 
radicalism increases the risk of breakdown considerably. This effect is 
significant at a 99 percent level of confidence (in other words, a result 
of this strength would only be found by chance less than 1 percent of the 
time). If radical actors win state power, they can impose very high costs 
on other actors, making it tempting for the losers to resort to coups as 
a way of preventing major and extremely difficult-to-reverse costs. For 
example, the radical policies of Salvador Allende’s leftist government 
in Chile (1970–73) pushed the dominant faction of the Christian Demo-
crats, the conservatives, and the military toward supporting the 1973 
coup. They feared that allowing the Popular Unity government to stay 
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in power would have disastrous consequences. Although in this example 
the breakdown was caused by fear of leftist radicalism at the height of 
the Cold War, the same logic applies to rightist radicalism. Conversely, 
the Chilean Socialist Party’s moderation after the reestablishment of de-
mocracy in 1990 made it easier for the democratic regime to survive. 
This finding is consistent with O’Donnell’s work on the level of threat 
as an impetus to democratic breakdowns.9 
Second, if actors have a normative preference for democracy, com-
petitive regimes are far less likely to break down. Here, the result is 
significant at a 95 percent level of confidence. Although this finding 
is hardly surprising, it shows O’Donnell’s prescience in arguing that 
actors’ normative preferences could offset many liabilities, including a 
high level of inequality, the lack of democratic experience in most Latin 
American countries, and severe economic challenges.10 
Argentina’s history shows how actors’ normative preference for 
democracy can have positive implications for regime survival. From 
the late 1920s until 1976, few actors in Argentina valued democracy 
on normative grounds. In 1930, the Conservatives, the Socialists, the 
military, and even parts of President Hipólito Yrigoyen’s own United 
Radical Party conspired against him. From 1946 to 1973, both of the 
main political parties (the Radicals and Peronists) and the powerful la-
bor unions were quick to defect from the democratic coalition. In 1955, 
the Radicals supported a successful coup against the populist dictator-
ship of General Juan Perón. In 1962, the Peronists and one faction of 
the Radicals supported a coup against a Radical president. In 1966, the 
Peronists and labor unions supported a coup against another Radical 
president. During those decades, powerful actors tolerated competitive 
politics only if their desired policies resulted. 
In response to the devastation unleashed by the 1976 military coup, 
the key actors accepted democratic competition as the legitimate route 
to winning political office with the return of democracy in 1983. This 
reorientation toward a normative preference for democracy allowed 
the regime to survive despite severe economic depressions in the 1980s 
and in 2001–2002; hyperinflation in 1989–91; and a steep rise in pov-
erty and inequality.11 When there were serious threats to democracy 
in the late 1980s, the unions and the main parties mobilized to protect 
it. Labor endured extremely negative economic conditions but never 
mobilized on behalf of a coup. Instrumental or strategic logic could 
explain why many actors defected from a destructive military regime 
(1976–83), but it is the change in actors’ normative regime preference 
that explains why they adhered to a poorly performing democracy for 
two decades.  
In order to grasp the huge effect that policy moderation and a norma-
tive preference for democracy have on regime survival, consider the fol-
lowing estimates. According to our results, if no political actor in Latin 
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America had made a normative commitment to democracy and if all 
actors had been radical during the period between 1978 and 2005 (hold-
ing all other country characteristics constant), the average competitive 
regime would have confronted a 17 percent risk of breakdown each year. 
The typical democracy would have lasted roughly six years, and the 
third wave of democratization never would have begun. By contrast, if 
after 1978 all actors had embraced a normative commitment to democ-
racy and had been moderate, the expected risk of breakdown would have 
dropped to .04 percent per year, and competitive regimes would have 
been virtually impregnable. 
Actors’ Preferences and Regime Outcomes
Actors’ normative regime preferences track closely with regime out-
comes (in other words, consulting the state of preferences tells a lot 
about whether a competitive regime is likely to survive). By contrast, 
the factors that other approaches stress—including class, moderniza-
tion, and culture—do not track as closely with regime outcomes. We 
argue that 1) “causally distant” explanations such as structural theo-
ries and most mass-cultural theories fail to explain regime outcomes in 
Latin America; 2) these explanations actually tell us little that can help 
to account for actors’ policy or regime preferences; 3) explanations of 
regime outcomes must work through actors’ behavior; and 4) normative 
preferences strongly inform some actors’ behavior. If all four of these 
points are correct, then to understand regime change and survival, we 
must consider actors’ normative preferences. Far from being too close in 
the chain of causality to be a useful explanation, then, they are a neces-
sary though not sufficient part of the explanation.
Our third key finding is that a more democratic regional environment 
makes it considerably less likely that competitive regimes will break 
down. This result meshes with the large literature that has emerged over 
the last 25 years on the importance of international influences on de-
mocratization. A more democratic regional political environment fos-
ters the diffusion of ideals about what is possible and desirable in poli-
tics, and it led the Organization of American States to establish legal 
norms intended to safeguard competitive regimes. Likewise, the end of 
El Salvador’s twelve-year civil war in 1992 and the county’s subsequent 
establishment of a competitive political regime helped to inspire similar 
developments in Guatemala a few years later. Conversely, before the 
third wave, some authoritarian regimes provided inspiration for coups 
and authoritarian leaders elsewhere in the region. For example, the Cu-
ban revolution encouraged the formation of revolutionary leftist move-
ments throughout most of Latin America, in turn prompting a right-wing 
counterreaction. In the 1960s and 1970s, the national-security doctrine 
that justified military coups and authoritarian rule as a way of thwarting 
133Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Li~nán
leftist threats spread throughout the hemisphere. The establishment in 
1964 of a “successful” Brazilian military dictatorship—it boosted eco-
nomic growth and thwarted the left—made Southern Cone militaries 
more prone to believe that they too might govern successfully. 
The fourth notable finding is that structural factors (the level of de-
velopment and the percentage of the labor force engaged in manufactur-
ing) had no direct consequences for democratic stability in Latin America 
from 1945 to 2005. Structural predictors do not affect the probability of 
democratic breakdowns, even if we exclude the more proximate causes of 
breakdown tapped by our variables for policy radicalism and normative 
preferences for democracy. Modernization theory claims that the most 
economically developed countries are also the most likely to be democrat-
ic.12 Yet the seemingly robust association between income and democracy 
does not hold for Latin America during our six-decade period of study. 
O’Donnell was right to be skeptical about the impact of moderniza-
tion on the survival of competitive regimes in this region.13 Countries 
with high per capita GDPs (Argentina in 1951, 1962, 1966, and 1973; 
Chile in 1973; Uruguay in 1973) experienced democratic breakdowns, 
while countries with much lower per capita GDPs (such as Costa Rica 
from 1949 onward) had democracies that survived for generations. Ar-
gentina’s per capita GDP in 1976, the year of its last democratic break-
down, was US$6,857; Costa Rica’s per capita GDP in 1949, when it 
inaugurated a competitive regime, was only $1,836. In short, the finding 
for a broader sample of countries that higher per capita income lowers 
the likelihood of democratic breakdown does not hold for Latin Amer-
ica. Likewise, the size of the labor force engaged in manufacturing did 
not influence democratic survival.
If we accept the premise that political actors determine whether re-
gimes survive or fall, then it necessarily follows that structural factors, 
including the level of development, do not directly affect the stability 
of competitive regimes. Structural factors instead may influence the or-
ganization of political actors as well as their preferences and strategic 
choices. Finally, counterintuitively and contrary to some findings about 
a broader range of countries, economic performance as measured by 
per capita GDP growth had no impact on the likelihood of democratic 
survival or breakdown in Latin America from 1945 to 2005. Competi-
tive regimes survived in Latin America despite grinding recessions, in-
creasing inequalities, and hyperinflation in the 1980s and 1990s. Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Nicaragua all had four- or five-digit inflation 
rates in the 1980s, with no breakdown of their competitive regimes. 
The region endured two decades of anemic average growth rates (1982 
to 2002) even as the incidence of democratic breakdowns fell sharply. 
Between 1945 and 1977, the probability of breakdowns was far higher 
even though average economic performance was much better. If most 
actors believe in the intrinsic desirability of democracy and if the re-
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gional political environment is largely favorable to democracy, com-
petitive regimes can withstand poor performance for an extended time.  
In sum, the combination of three key factors has enabled democra-
cies to survive in Latin America—a favorable regional political context 
(reflected in the presence of other democratic countries in the region), 
along with a strong normative preference for democracy and a lack of 
radical policy preferences among key actors. These findings largely 
explain Latin America’s stunning transformation from a region where 
dictatorships had prevailed for most of the twentieth century to a region 
where only a single openly authoritarian regime (Cuba) exists today. 
During the third wave of democratization, the regional political environ-
ment became much more supportive of democracy. Radicalism declined 
as revolutionary socialism and right-wing authoritarianism gradually 
became discredited. More actors became convinced of the intrinsic de-
sirability of democracy. These changes have not ensured high-quality 
democracy or good governance, nor have they permanently inoculated 
the region against the possibility of backsliding. But they have made it 
difficult for new openly authoritarian regimes to emerge and stabilize, 
and they enabled most competitive regimes to survive withering eco-
nomic crises in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The statistical results are open to an obvious concern about endoge-
neity: If a competitive regime is in crisis, that crisis could push some 
actors to adopt more radical policy positions or to suppress their norma-
tive preference for democracy. Although we lack space for a full treat-
ment of this problem here, there are numerous historical cases in which 
actors’ policy radicalism and normative preferences help to explain re-
gime outcomes and in which those outcomes clearly postdate the actors’ 
adoption of their positions, meaning that the outcomes cannot explain 
the positions. The effect of normative regime preferences and policy 
radicalism does not stem only from reverse causation.
An Actor-Based Approach
In this essay, we have introduced a new strategy for the study of regime 
breakdown and survival—namely, the use of an actor-based approach on 
a scale that is large enough to allow for quantitative analysis. Previous 
quantitative studies of democratic survival neither identified key actors 
nor tested propositions about regime survival and breakdown using the 
observed behaviors and orientations of real political players. Most vari-
ants of modernization theory, for example, fail to explicitly specify actors 
or causal mechanisms, thereby leaving the reasons for the linkage between 
a higher level of development and a greater probability of democracy un-
clear. Recent class-based theories about political regimes postulate that 
class conflicts over income redistribution determine the nature of political 
regimes. Yet these theories fail to prove that the poor, middle, and upper 
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classes are all in fact able to overcome collective-action problems and 
become coherent political actors. Because battles about political regimes 
involve specific actors whose preferences regarding the regime are not 
easily predictable on the basis of structural or cultural variables, we advo-
cate historically grounded, actor-based approaches to studying regimes. 
Alongside the “actorless” approaches to the study of political regimes, 
there is an alternative tradition that focuses on concrete historical actors. 
This includes Juan J. Linz’s iconic work on democratic breakdowns14 
and O’Donnell and Schmitter’s groundbreaking study of transitions 
from authoritarian rule,15 as well as many rich qualitative case studies. 
The best of these works have greatly enriched our understanding of why 
democracies emerge and stabilize or break down. Our core hypotheses 
flow from this latter qualitative tradition. Yet the generalizability of its 
findings has been uncertain because of the limited number of obser-
vations. Our approach builds on insights gained from these qualitative 
studies and, for the first time, applies an actor-based approach to a broad 
range of countries over a long period of time. 
We emphasize three substantive findings that expand on O’Donnell’s 
seminal contributions. First, the level of development neither raised 
nor lowered the likelihood of competitive regimes breaking down 
in Latin America between 1945 and 2005. This generally confirms 
O’Donnell’s analysis in Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritar-
ianism. Second, policy radicalism makes it more difficult to sustain 
competitive political regimes. When strong radical forces compete for 
political power, the chance grows that some actors will find the cost of 
tolerating democratic politics too high. Radical threats encourage de-
fection from competitive regimes. Conversely, pervasive policy mod-
eration lowers the stakes of democratic politics. Third, actors’ nor-
mative attitudes about the political regime have a significant impact 
on whether competitive regimes endure or break down. Some actors 
intrinsically value democracy far more than others. Democracy can 
withstand severe crises and protracted bad performance if most ac-
tors are normatively committed to democracy as a regime. Conversely, 
competitive regimes are highly vulnerable to breakdown if the most 
powerful actors are indifferent to liberal democracy’s intrinsic value. 
These normative preferences about the regime are not reducible to 
structural factors or to broad sociocultural patterns. 
Measuring actors’ policy radicalism and normative preferences con-
cerning the political regime is a huge challenge, and we do not claim to 
have solved all the difficulties. If policy radicalism and actors’ norma-
tive preferences are important variables that are not reducible to struc-
tural factors or to broad sociocultural patterns, however, social scientists 
should strive to incorporate them in their analyses. Earlier scholars did 
so in a qualitative way; we believe that it is now time to study these is-
sues with quantitative tools as well. 
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